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This paper is a preliminary discussion of some theoretical and methodological issues 
related to my PhD thesis. The topic of the dissertation can be succinctly formulated as 
the legal and economic analysis of paternalism in contract law. I got interested in this 
problematic when reading M. J. Trebilcock’s book (The limits of freedom of contract, 
1993) and writing a review article on it, and earlier still when I wrote a paper on the 
economic analysis of Hungarian and European occupational safety regulation of the 
work with display screen equipment. 
  The thesis starts with some discussion of conceptual and normative issues of 
paternalism in political and legal philosophy, and then focuses on legal policy questions 
in  contract  law.  Methodologically,  my  purpose  is  to  analyse  whether  and  how  the 
traditional economic arguments against paternalism and for freedom of contract should 
be reassessed in light of recent empirical and theoretical studies. More specifically, the 
question is whether the anti-paternalist view based on consumer sovereignty remains 
valid if, following behavioural decision theory we assume that not only (at least one of) 
the contracting individuals but also the legislator/regulator is imperfectly rational or 
not fully informed. That is, whether we have to modify the traditional anti-paternalism 
of  law  and  economics  for  anti-anti-paternalism:  a  limited  and  critical  version  of 
paternalism. In this paper I discuss the conceptual and methodological background of 
an economic approach to paternalism in contract law. 
                                                 
∗  Graduate  College  for  Law  and  Economics,  University  of  Hamburg  and  Department  for  Legal 
Philosophy, Pázmány Péter Catholic University Faculty of Law and Political Science, Budapest. Address: 
Von-Melle-Park 5, Hamburg D-20146 Germany. E-mail: csernep@yahoo.com. This is a revised version 
of  the  paper  I  presented  at  the  2
nd  German  –  French  Talks  in  Law  and  Economics  in  Saarbrücken, 
December 2005. I benefited much from the comments by Dieter Schmidtchen and Paul Calcott at the 
conference. 
1 Cserne: Freedom of choice and paternalism in contract law
Produced by bepress.com, 2011  1 
 
1. Introduction..............................................................................................................................................2 
1.1. Motivation ........................................................................................................................................2 
1.2. Methods............................................................................................................................................3 
2. Paternalism and freedom of contract – conceptual and justificatory issues..............................................5 
2.1. Problems of definition ......................................................................................................................5 
2.1.1. No starting point in law.............................................................................................................5 
2.1.2. A rough definition.....................................................................................................................6 
2.2. Internal distinctions: kinds of paternalism........................................................................................6 
2.2.1. Hard and soft paternalism.........................................................................................................7 
2.2.2. Further distinctions ...................................................................................................................9 
2.3. Problems of justification...................................................................................................................9 
2.3.1. Theoretical over-determination of rules....................................................................................9 
2.3.2. Paternalism as linked to modern individuality........................................................................11 
2.3.3. Freedom and benevolence.......................................................................................................11 
2.3.4. Overlapping consensus: avoiding metaphysics.......................................................................12 
2.3.5. What paternalism is not: an eliminative strategy....................................................................14 
2.3.6. Justification through redefinition? ..........................................................................................15 
2.4. Two specificities of legal paternalism ............................................................................................17 
2.4.1. Over-inclusiveness and redistribution.....................................................................................17 
2.4.2. Uniformed regulator................................................................................................................17 
2.5. Freedom of contract........................................................................................................................18 
3. Analysis of paternalism with economic tools: mainstream and others...................................................20 
3.1. Paternalism in the mainstream........................................................................................................20 
3.1.1. “Consumer sovereignty”.........................................................................................................20 
3.1.2. Justifying paternalism “by eliminative redefinition”: ad hoc amendments ............................21 
3.1.2. Need for methodological change?...........................................................................................22 
3.2. Behavioural law and economics.....................................................................................................23 
3.2.1. Rationality...............................................................................................................................23 
3.2.2. Relevance for contract law......................................................................................................24 
3.2.3. Problems with the behavioural approach................................................................................24 
3.2.4. Asymmetric paternalism.........................................................................................................26 
3.3. Freedom of choice: the non-welfarist dimension of paternalism....................................................27 
3.4. The lesson of part three...................................................................................................................28 
4. The proper role of paternalism in contract regulation ............................................................................28 
4.1. The legal policy perspective...........................................................................................................28 
4.2. The economics of contracts vs. the economics of contract law......................................................28 
4.3. The specificity of contract law with respect to paternalism............................................................29 
4.3.1. Two forms of contract regulation............................................................................................29 
4.3.2. The limited importance of doctrinal boundaries .....................................................................30 
4.3.3. Doctrinal Segmentation? Four categories of contract.............................................................31 
4.4. Non-paternalist reasons for limiting freedom of contract...............................................................32 
4.4.1. Negative externality (harm and offence).................................................................................32 
4.4.2. Coercion..................................................................................................................................33 
4.5. Prima facie paternalistic contract doctrines....................................................................................34 
4.5.1. Imperfect information.............................................................................................................34 
4.5.2. Disclosure, cooling-off, unconscionability.............................................................................35 
4.6. An outlook: paternalism in the new Hungarian Civil Code............................................................36 
References..................................................................................................................................................37 
 
2 German Working Papers in Law and Economics Vol. 2006,  Paper 6
http://www.bepress.com/gwp/default/vol2006/iss1/art6  2 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Motivation 
In the introductory chapter of the leading American law and economics textbook we 
read:  “economists  frequently  extol  the  virtues  of  voluntary  exchange,  but  economics 
does not have a detailed account of what it means for an exchange to be voluntary. As 
we  shall  see,  contract  law  has  a  complex  well-articulated  theory  of  volition.  If 
economists will listen to what the law has to teach them, they will find their models 
being drawn closer to reality.”
1 
  Even  if  this  gesture  of  two  economists  towards  lawyers  is  to  be  appreciated,  it 
cannot  be  taken  fully  seriously  as  it  stands.  Jurisprudence  and  legal  doctrines  may 
doubtlessly often reflect practical rationality and offer at the level of folk psychology an 
intuitively appealing shortcut to endless philosophical debates. More precisely there is 
some  close-to-ordinary-language  (English)  or  dogmatic-technical  (Continental)  legal 
meaning of voluntariness (and other concepts like causation, intent, etc.) which usually 
half-knowingly reflects the philosophical or scientific standpoint of earlier ages or is 
just expressing some naïve, folk notions.
2 For law as a practical enterprise this is in 
most cases fully satisfactory. 
  But  what  law  says  about  voluntariness  can  be  called  a  “theory”  only  in  this 
“practical” sense. If we want to understand and/or criticize the rationale behind legal 
rules then what law regulates in this or that way has to be  critically examined and 
evaluated from an outside perspective, i.e. from a not strictly legal point of view. For 
instance,  it  is  impossible  to  answer  from  a  purely  legal  perspective  how  it  is  to 
reasonably regulate the legally required degree of voluntariness of contract formation  
or the criteria for the judicial control of standard form contracts.
3 
                                                 
1 Cooter - Ulen 2004, 11. 
2 See, e. g. Hart – Honoré 1985, Watson 1974. 
3 This is especially true for the contract doctrines expressed in most of the civil codes in Europe, dating 
from the 19
th century when legal scholars deliberately worked out their doctrinal constructions, both in 
civil law and common law countries as markedly ‘legal’ doctrines, i.e. independently of philosophical 
theories. More specifically, as James Gordley has convincingly reconstructed (see Gordley 1991), the 
Aristotelian  and  Thomistic  philosophical  theories  which  were  used  by  the  late  Scholastics  to  give  a 
coherent theoretical structure to contract law (and other areas of private law as well) from the 16
th century 
on,  have  gone  to  disrepute  and  oblivion  in  later  centuries.  But  there  has  not  been  any  overarching 
alternative philosophical theory at hand to replace them, thus the fragmentary and heterogeneous ‘legal’ 
doctrines of the last two centuries, most prominently the will theory of contracts. 
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  Of course, there are several possible outside perspectives. Referring back to the 
quotation, the problem motivating my research is how economic analysis can face this 
and similar challenges posed by the law. What has an economic analysis of freedom of 
contract and paternalism to offer for our understanding of the logic of contract law? If 
Cooter and Ulen are right to say that traditional economics (and thus standard law and 
economics)  does  not  offer  a  fully  developed  answer  to  such  questions,  we  should 
possibly look for them elsewhere. 
   This  paper  takes  the  methodology  of  rational  choice  theory,  as  applied  and 
modified in the law and economics literature as a starting point and then discuss the 
possible limits and corrections to this approach. In this sense it proposes an “economic” 




As  I  see  it,  the  tools  recently  developed  within  two  branches  of  economics  can 
contribute  to  a  theoretically  more  coherent  and  simultaneously  more  nuanced 
perspective on the question of freedom of contract and paternalism than we currently 
have in law and economics. Needless to say, both freedom of contract and paternalism 
have been discussed in economics for some time, though the systematic analysis of the 
problematic  is  relatively  recent.  The  standard  law  and  economics  literature  usually 
views paternalism as a wrong reason for limiting freedom of contract or starts at least 
with an anti-paternalist presumption. This, however, is not a strongly and coherently 
argued view. It generally uses a strange mixture of liberal and utilitarian (welfarist) 
arguments  and  relies  on  some  questionable  implicit  empirical  claims  as  well.  By 
reconsidering  the  standard  economic  arguments  and  confronting  them  with 
philosophical and jurisprudential considerations, I suggest modifying the traditional law 
and economics arguments about paternalism in two ways: 
(1) The empirical findings of behavioural decision theory offer a more realistic view of 
the situations susceptible for paternalistic intervention, 
(2)  The  analytical  tools  of  the  freedom  of  choice  literature  help  to  clarify  the  non-
welfarist dimension of the problem. 
                                                 
4 For the methodological background see Cserne 2004. A more precise argument (in Hungarian) is in 
Cserne 2005. 
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  Then, in light of these theoretical findings, it is possible to analyse and criticise in 
detail some contract law rules and doctrines that at first glance look paternalist. The last 
part  of  my  thesis  shall  be  dedicated  to  a  policy  oriented  analysis  of  these  specific 
contract law rules. This paper, however, concerns conceptual, empirical and normative 
issues as the theoretical underpinnings of the policy-oriented arguments. More precisely 
I shall deal with some aspects of the following three types of questions in turn: 
1.  (conceptual  and  normative)  What  does  paternalism  mean?  Is  it  justified  to  limit 
one’s freedom in order to promote his good? In which cases, to what extent and by 
whom? Why and to what extent do we need freedom of contract? What are the 
legitimate reasons to interfere with contracts? 
2.  (empirical) Do people generally and in given contexts choose rationally? Do they 
evaluate risks correctly? How do they process the information available for them? 
Are there legal or political institutions that are more suitable to evaluate certain 
types of risk? How do individuals (consumers) and legal entities (firms) react to 
different  regulations,  what  are  the  side-effects  and  possible  non-intended 
consequences? 
3.  (policy oriented) Should law interfere with not fully-informed or not fully-rational 
contractual agreements for this reason, i.e. in order to protect one party against a 
sub-optimal  contract?  What  are  the  best  possible  instruments  for  that?  Which 
contract law doctrines serve legitimate paternalistic purposes? 
The thesis is built on previous research in various fields: the philosophical literature on 
paternalism, the economic analysis of contract law, the existing mainstream economic 
literature  on  paternalism,  the  recent  behavioural  law  and  economics  literature  on 
paternalism (for all these see the still incomplete list of references) and offers a selective 
and  critical  synthesis  of  these.  It  also  draws  on  the  social  choice  and  political 
philosophy literature on freedom of choice by adapting the results to the problem of 
paternalism. This kind of application has to my knowledge not yet been analysed. The 
most extensive last part of the thesis is novel both in its perspective when asking for the 
justifiability of paternalistic contract law rules of different legal systems in light of the 
modified law and economics arguments, and in its subject matter when analysing the 
contract law book of the draft of the new Hungarian Civil Code. 
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2. Paternalism and freedom of contract – conceptual and 
justificatory issues 
Besides  paternalistic  individual  actions  (e.g.  towards  children),  cases  of  legal 
paternalism  also  abound:  from  medical  law  (the  regulation  of  the  doctor–patient 
relationship),  drug  prohibition,  occupational  safety  and  health  regulation  to  the 
mandatory  waiting  time  before  marriage  and  the  general  irrelevance  of  consent  to 
mutilation and homicide on part of the victim in criminal law. Sometimes paternalism 
can be an issue in a very subtle way, e.g. when it is about transfer of information and 
true or false believes. E.g. can a physician waive responsibility for the harm to his 
patient if she refuses or chooses certain treatment just because she does not want to hear 
and accept or believe the information, given to her by the doctor? How much is the 
doctor obliged and allowed to convince, persuade, press and coerce the patient to have 
or not to have a certain therapy? Similar questions about the interference of family, 
friends, strangers, and officials in our life we encounter almost every day. Nevertheless, 
paternalism  is  a  relatively  specific  phenomenon.  So  we  should  beware  of  the 
indiscriminate use of the term for any interference with freedom of choice. 
As a preliminary, I should also note that for most Western people nowadays the 
term ‘paternalism’ itself has some negative connotation. Consequently, almost every 
substantial contribution in the theoretical literature on paternalism starts with discussing 
the possibility of a non-pejorative and gender-neutral use of the word (or the eventual 
need for switching to a neologism like ‘parentalism’). In the following I use the word 
‘paternalism’ because of its familiarity, and use it in a descriptive (classificatory) sense, 
dealing  with  the  question  of  evaluation  (justification)  separately  and  leaving  out 
possible  gender  issues  altogether.  Nevertheless,  the  definition  of  paternalism  is  not 
unproblematic. 
 
2.1. Problems of definition 
2.1.1. No starting point in law 
It is primarily not for the intrinsic interest of philosophical issues
5 that I do not jump 
over  the  conceptual  problem  of  defining  paternalism  and  directly  focus  on  a  more 
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doctrinal or empirical analysis. It is rather the case that it would be almost impossible to 
do that. Both freedom and paternalism are ‘essentially contested concepts’.
6 Especially 
with  respect  to  freedom  (liberty),  it  is  impossible  to  find  the  clear  boundaries  or 
conceptual features around which there would be a reasonable degree of consensus in 
the literature. Even if we put in brackets the intricacies of highly abstract philosophical 
distinctions, it is not easy to determine what we should mean by paternalism in law. 
Although  intuitively  we  can  determine  a  large  number  of  regulations  which  seem 
paternalistic, the term itself hardly ever figures in legal texts or commentaries.
7 Thus we 
cannot avoid recurring to some extra-legal definition of the term, and then using it in 
order to circumscribe the field we have to deal with. 
 
2.1.2. A rough definition 
There are three conditions that are usually included in the definition of paternalism. 
Thus the paternalist  
(1) intentionally limits the subject’s liberty,  
(2) acts primarily out of benevolence toward the subject, and 
(3) disregards (is not motivated by) the subject’s contemporaneous preferences. 
What these elements of the definition more precisely mean should become clear later 
on. Also, we have to make clear which related phenomena should be distinguished from 
paternalism. Still, substantive problems cannot be solved by definition. As indicated 
above, paternalism has some justifiable and some unjustifiable cases which differ not on 
the level of definition but with regard to their justifiability (legitimacy, reasonableness, 
etc.). More precisely, they can be distinguished conceptually only if we introduce some 
further specifications for different kinds of paternalism. 
 
2.2. Internal distinctions: kinds of paternalism  
In the philosophical literature, the following distinctions are usually made: 
                                                                                                                                               
5 For the philosophical literature on paternalism, see e.g. Sartorius 1983, Kleinig 1984, Feinberg 1986, 
Suber 1999, Dworkin 2002. 
6 Gallie 1956, cf. Smith 2002. 
7 Eidenmüller 1995, 360. 
7 Cserne: Freedom of choice and paternalism in contract law
Produced by bepress.com, 2011  7 
(1) pure vs. impure paternalism: in the former case, the motive/reason behind an 
action, a rule etc. is only paternalistic, with impure paternalism it is mixed with 
other reasons. To be sure, this distinction works at the level of actions, rules, etc. 
while I will refer to paternalism as a reason. Thus when we speak about legal 
rules, their paternalistic rationale, if any, is almost always impure. This is the 
consequence  of  what  I  shall  call  below  the  theoretical  over-determination  of 
rules. 
(2) direct vs. indirect paternalism: this distinction is especially relevant for contract 
law. By regulating contracts, not only the freedom of choice of the self-harming 
individual  (the  subject  of  direct  paternalism)  but  that  of  the  other  party  is 
limited.  The  latter  case,  when  A’s  freedom  is  restricted  in  order  to 
paternalistically  promote  B’s  good  is  called  indirect  paternalism.  Indirect 
paternalism, of course, can be done with or without direct paternalism happening 
at the same time. 
 
2.2.1. Hard and soft paternalism 
A conceptual problem about paternalism is that what free will (voluntary consent) in a 
specific context means is not easy to tell, as there is no self-evident reference point or 
threshold. Or more precisely, there are a number of criteria that should be fulfilled for 
an action to count as fully autonomous. In practice this is an unattainable ideal thus the 
autonomy  is  always  limited.  This  of  course  does  not  in  itself  justify  paternalistic 
intervention  but  leads  to  a  useful  distinction,  first  introduced  in  the  literature  by 
Feinberg. He suggests to distinguish between hard (strong) and soft (weak) paternalism 
in  the  following  way.  Both  forms  are  restricting  individual  liberty  but  while  soft 
paternalism applies to actions which are not fully voluntary or informed and thus the 
intervention  is  not  especially  controversial  (more  easily  justified),  in  case  of  hard 
paternalism this justification is more problematic as here autonomous (self-harming) 
action is restricted. 
The  standard  distinguishing  feature  of  hard  paternalism  is  that  the  subject’s 
conduct is substantially voluntary. Thus the lack of substantial voluntariness negates the 
value  of  autonomy  with  regard  to  that  conduct.  There  are  three  sub-conditions  to 
substantial voluntariness: 
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1. Capability of making choices (even if the decisions are foolish, unwise, reckless, 
these are still decisions of an autarchic subject) 
2.  Substantial  freedom  from  controlling  influences  such  as  coercion,  duress,  or 
manipulation 
3. Substantial freedom from epistemic defects, such as ignorance of the nature of her 
conduct or its foreseeable consequences.
8 
So, if the subject’s conduct is substantially voluntary, then liberty limitation with 
respect to such conduct is hard paternalism and conversely, if the subject’s conduct is 
not substantially voluntary for any of the three reasons above, then liberty limitation 
with respect to such conduct is soft paternalism.
9 
  The importance of the distinction becomes clear if we agree with Joel Feinberg 
that soft (weak) paternalism is not paternalism in any interesting sense, because it is not 
based on a liberty-limiting principle independent of the harm principle. In this case, the 
intervention is defended (and according to Feinberg: justified) as the protection from a 
harm caused to the individual by conditions beyond his control.
10  
At first glance, the three sub-conditions may remind one different contract law 
doctrines.  The  rules  of  incapacity  are  supposed  to  regulate  that  only  people  being 
capable of making choices (in the above said sense) can conclude a valid contract. The 
contract law rules of fraud, duress serve to guarantee the lack of certain substantial 
external controlling influences (but not the absence of others, e.g. economic necessity). 
Substantial freedom from epistemic defects is taken care of, e.g. via rules on mistake, 
disclosure or cooling-off periods and other formalities making consent more deliberate.  
It is in the last part of the thesis that we can analyse systematically whether this fit really 
holds for the contract law rules under scrutiny. Thus if the answer is affirmative, and the 
justifiability of soft paternalism is plausible then we can be possibly distinguish these 
                                                 
8 See Pope 2004, 711-713, and references there. 
9 In the philosophical literature, T. M. Pope criticises this distinction of hard and soft paternalism as it is 
not defined by the reason of the agent for limiting the subject’s liberty (Pope 2004). According to him, if 
the agent disregards (does not care) whether the subject’s conduct is substantially voluntary or not and 
limits his liberty notwithstanding, he exercises hard paternalism. As we shall see, this is often the case 
when paternalism is institutionalised via general rules and applies both to voluntary and non-voluntary 
actions.  It  is,  however,  not  clear,  why  we  should  care  about  this  difference  between  the  ‘objective’ 
voluntariness of the subject’s conduct and the paternalist’s ‘subjective’ perception of it at the level of 
definition and not at the level of justification instead.    
10 This is the way Feinberg defines his version of paternalism, by saying “soft paternalism would permit 
us to protect him from ‘nonvoluntary choices,’ which, being the genuine choices of no one at all, are no 
less foreign to him.” (Feinberg 1986, 12) For a critique, see Arneson 2005.  
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doctrines from instances of hard paternalism which are more difficult to justify. 
 
2.2.2. Further distinctions 
As  the  concept  of  soft  paternalism  already  indicates,  there  are  some  necessary 
connections between analytical and normative problems here. Not only the distinction 
between hard and soft paternalism, but some further ones are also highly relevant for the 
justifiability of paternalism. Thus, it is not indifferent whether the intervention is  
(1) benefit-conferring or self-harm preventing,  
(2) exercised by an individual or by the state, and in the latter case 
(3) by means of private law, taxation or criminal law.      
In the following chapters the focus will be on legal paternalism via contract law rules. 
Here, the intervention is by the state (either through legislation or by judicial control) 
but with relatively non-coercive means and mostly in order to prevent harm (compared 
to a status quo) to be inflicted on a contracting party. As we shall see, these specificities 
have a great impact on the legitimacy of paternalism. Still, the general questions about 
the justifiability of paternalism have logical priority. 
 
2.3. Problems of justification 
2.3.1. Theoretical over-determination of rules 
As mentioned above, paternalism is understood as a reason for action or in case of legal 
paternalism, a possible justification for a rule (being itself in need of justification). It 
seems to be a general human characteristic that in a given instance (action, rule) several 
principles are or could be in play (as explanations, motives, rationalisations etc. for the 
action  or  rule).  The  possible  overarching  theoretical  systems  behind  more  specific 
reasons  for  intervention  and  also  the  possible  justifications  of  a  concrete  rule  are 
multiple.  That  is,  one  can  construct  several  more  or  less  coherent  explanations  or 
justifications for a rule. They are, of course, not equally plausible or convincing. Instead 
of discussing this far reaching problematic in its abstract meta-theoretical form, let’s see 
a concrete example how this problem is relevant for the justification of paternalism.     
Helmets and tobacco. It is often argued that to justify the compulsory use of 
10 German Working Papers in Law and Economics Vol. 2006,  Paper 6
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safety helmets or the ban on tobacco advertisements it is fully sufficient to refer to the 
social burdens caused by accidents and tobacco-related medical costs and thereby the 
‘dubious’ arguments about autonomy, coercion etc. can be avoided. In contemporary 
European  countries  with  universal  (i.e.  nationwide  and  compulsory)  social  security 
systems,  we  can  allegedly  avoid  referring  to  paternalism  in  order  to  justify  the 
prohibition of certain self-harming behaviours and can “simply” refer to the external 
effects,  i.e.  the  financial  burdens  that  a  given  action  would  cause  –  provided  self-
inflicted harms are not excluded from the coverage of social security. 
But it is possible that in pure social expense terms these paternalistic rules are 
counter-effective.  While  certain  accidents  without  safety  helmets  often  cause  death, 
helmets usually save “only” the life of a severely disabled (i.e. in social expense terms 
burdensome)  person.  Without  smoking  people  live  longer  on  average,  thus  it  might 
easily be that they use up more social funds (mainly in form of pension) than smokers 
who die relatively early, near to the end of their working carrier. Not denying that if 
these  effects  are  empirically  provable,  they  are  remarkable  from  a  purely  economic 
perspective, still they are not workable as ‘public reasons’ in the Rawlsian sense.
11 If we 
don’t  want  the  arguments  about  paternalism  to  run  fully  against  our  intuitions,  we 
should take paternalism seriously, and possibly also acknowledge the relevance of some 
non-welfarist arguments, as I will argue below. 
The example serves to illustrate that if a rule is impurely paternalistic, i.e. there 
are several reasons behind it, we have to analyse each reason for its plausibility. Then 
we can see whether these reasons, taken together are enough to justify the rule. 
In law we can see this uneasy relationship of general principles and specific 
rules  very  clearly.  Namely,  if  we  want  to  analyse  a  given  legal  doctrine  non-
dogmatically, i.e. not by asking for its technicalities, wording, or its place in a larger 
body of the legal system etc. but critically, looking for reasons justifying it, we often 
find that a given rule can be backed by several, often contradictory principles. Due to 
this over-determination we might not see clearly if a given rule is the expression of 
paternalism, self-interest of an influential group, symbolic expression of a generally 
held value (moralism) or the instrumentally rational response to an externality problem. 
To  be  sure,  what  matters  are  not  the  (unobservable  and  contradictory)  subjective 
11 Cserne: Freedom of choice and paternalism in contract law
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intentions of the lawmakers but the possible justifications for a legal rule. Of course, the 
legitimacy and authority of law largely depends on whether its rules are enacted and 
enforced for the right reasons. 
 
2.3.2. Paternalism as linked to modern individuality 
Historically, the problem of justifying paternalism is linked to the raise of liberalism 
and the value of individuality. Speaking about the same phenomenon in earlier ages and 
different cultures, we are inclined to use another term, patriarchalism.
12 Patriarchalism 
is a social order in which the patriarch’s concern to secure his own and his subjects’ 
individual  good  is  subsumed  under  a  conception  of  the  general  good  that  gives  it 
definition and to which it contributes. E.g. in the medieval European social and cultural 
setting,  characterised  by  general  views  on  the  relational  nature  of  the  self  who  is 
embedded in his roles,  patriarchalism was backed by  generally  accepted values.  By 
contrast, in case of paternalism (as a typically modern concept) we conceive the good of 
the paternalised individual as sufficiently independent of the good of others or some 
social whole to constitute on its own a focus of attention. 
 
2.3.3. Freedom and benevolence 
In defining and evaluating paternalism, we shouldn’t confound words. There might be 
other values competing with freedom (autonomy) and not everything valuable is a sort 
of freedom. So if we want to limit freedom of choice in certain situations, then it is 
better to say that in a given case there are good reasons for preferring something else, 
e.g. well-being or security to freedom, instead of arguing that it is ‘real’ or ‘positive’ 
etc. freedom that is promoted by paternalism.
13 At least if we define paternalism in the 
way that it implies doing something against the (free) will of the agent. 
  As mentioned before, paternalism is a certain kind of reason that we may use to 
                                                                                                                                               
11 See Rawls 1993, Gaus 2003, Larmore 2003. We shall come back to the problem of public reason and 
overlapping consensus in sec. 2.3.4. 
12 At least, according to the standard narrative in the history of political thought which attaches much 
importance to John Locke as a liberal political thinker and his critique of Sir Robert Filmer’s work, 
Patriarcha in the Two Treatises of Government (see Filmer 1991).   
13 Still this seems to be the view expressed in Burrows 1993, one of the few L&E articles in favour of 
paternalism. 
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justify or condemn restrictions of liberty. Liberty-limiting principles include mainly (1) 
the harm principle, (2) the offence principle, (3) moralism, and (4) paternalism.
14 Since 
J. S. Mill’s ideas about the limits of state power and the harm principle as the only 
justification  for  the  use  of  coercion  against  competent  individuals  has  become 
widespread in the Western world, paternalism has been a central problem of legal and 
political theory.
15  Paternalism is problematic from the liberal point of view as it implies 
promoting  the  good  of  a  person  against  his  (free)  will  thus  violating  individual 
autonomy for the sake of the individual’s welfare. The freedom-diminishing character 
of paternalism raises a moral question about it. As for justification, paternalism is not 
such an essentially condemnable thing as murder: in a formal sense it is rather like 
killing which has justified and unjustified cases.
16 The moral interest of paternalism 
comes from the juxtaposition of two values: freedom and benevolence.
17 In law, and 
especially  in  contract  law  there  are  also  some  specific  arguments  for  or  against 
paternalism, as we shall see below. 
   
2.3.4. Overlapping consensus: avoiding metaphysics 
Despite the general acceptance of the importance of liberty as a social and political 
value, in the Western world, there is much disagreement about why to value it and how 
to compromise it with other values. Accordingly, in the contemporary  philosophical 
literature there is no consensus on the justifiability of paternalism. Looking at the end-
result we can roughly distinguish three standpoints: (1) hard anti-paternalists consider 
paternalism generally, thus even in its soft form unjustifiable; (2) soft anti-paternalists 
distinguish hard and soft paternalism and condemn only the former; (3) finally there are 
those  who  argue  that  even  hard  paternalism  can  be  justified  in  certain  contexts.  In 
contrast  to  law  and  legal  reasoning,  however,  in  philosophy  the  way  of  the 
argumentation is often more important or interesting than the end-result. Paternalism 
can be supported or attacked with very different arguments. Looking at the extensive 
philosophical  literature  on  the  topic,  it  seems  difficult  to  decide  between  the  three 
                                                 
14 For a more elaborate categorisation see Feinberg 1986, xvi-xviii. 
15 There is now an enormous body of secondary literature on Mill’s On Liberty. As one of the most 
thoroughgoing  contemporary  critique  see  Stephen  1992.  As  a  starting  point  for  the  contemporary 
interpretations see Dworkin 1997. 
16 Kleinig 1984. 
17 Kleinig 1984, ch. 1. 
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standpoints without discussing such far-reaching questions as the nature of the good and 
the meaning of free will.  
    Still, my aspirations in this thesis are much more modest. As far as normative 
philosophy is concerned, I try to avoid taking side in far-reaching metaphysical debates 
in  this  work.  Basically  I  will  follow  John  Rawls’  ideas  about  ‘public  reason’  and 
‘overlapping  consensus’  and  thus  use  arguments  that  can  be,  on  a  middle  level  of 
abstraction,  acceptable  or  at  least  reasonable  from  several  comprehensive 
philosophical/ethical  perspectives.
18  Although  I  don’t  think  that  this  is  the  only 
reasonable way to do political/legal philosophy, by speaking about legal issues of more 
practical  concern,  the  idea  of  searching  for  an  overlapping  consensus  seems  quite 
attractive  and  plausible.  Even  such  a  prominent  figure  of  the  law  and  economics 
movement  as  Richard  Posner  once  argued  for  this  idea  as  one  possible  basis  for  a 
general acceptance of the minimisation of social costs as the objective of tort (accident) 
law.
19 
Here we have to see whether a similar consensus is possible in another relatively 
specific area, the limitation of freedom of contract for preventing harm to a contracting 
party. To be more concrete and come closer to our topic, Michael Trebilcock brilliantly 
shows in his book on the limits of freedom of contract
20 how a given legal rule erecting 
such  a  limit  can  be  backed  by  arguments  coming  from  different  legal  and  political 
philosophies.  When  analysing  legal  rules  of  contract,  often  we  can  show  that  the 
freedom of contract or an intervention limiting it can have several justifications which 
are not necessarily coherent with each other. On the other hand, I will try to find and use 
arguments which are capable of creating this overlapping consensus in a limited area of 
law: the law of contracts. 
    Just  to  indicate  what  a  possible  overlapping  consensus  about  the  scope  of 
justified  paternalism  in  contract  law  might  be,  I  refer  to  a  stylised  version  of  the 
deontological (autonomy-based), the consequentialist (welfarist), and the perfectionist 
(Aristotelian)  perspective.  From  this  we  can  see  that  the  practical  conclusions  of 
different philosophical arguments might be quite similar. 
1.  If one says that people should have the right to choose self-harming actions because 
                                                 
18 See Rawls 1993. 
19 R. Posner 1995, 505. 
20 Trebilcock 1993. 
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there is an intrinsic value of freedom of choice, he still softens this anti-paternalist 
standpoint by allowing for intervention in certain cases. 
2.  If  one’s  starting  point  is  the  good  (well-being)  of  the  person,  as  he  himself 
conceives it, and additionally we have an empirically based presumption that 
freedom of choice promotes well-being, still this presumption can be refuted in 
any  instance.  More  weight  can  be  given  to  the  value  of  freedom  itself  by 
acknowledging that the freedom to make one’s own choices is a component of 
this well-being. 
3.  And what if the philosophical starting point is neither libertarian (deontological) 
anti-paternalism (like in 1.) nor a welfarist (consequentialist) view (like in 2.) 
but a perfectionist (communitarian) one? In this view one should strive for a 
good  which  is  supra-individual  (the  overall  utility,  happiness,  etc.  of  a 
community)  or  compare  the  individual’s  actual  actions  and  decisions  with  a 
morally  or  otherwise  superior  preference  or  value  system.  It  is  nevertheless 
possible to argue that in several cases the individual is the best judge of how to 
attain this state of affairs or/and that in certain cases a third party, especially the 
state is not able to promote this good better than the individual.  
To  be  sure,  in  Rawls’  view  overlapping  consensus  is  not  simply  a  compromise 
reached by softening or mixing irreconcilable views. I should not follow this idea here, 
only indicate that there are good arguments that there are conceptions of perfectionism 
and liberalism that do not exclude each other
21 and to some extent they can also be 
harmonised with economic theory.
22   
 
2.3.5. What paternalism is not: an eliminative strategy 
In  view  of  both  the  theoretical  over-determination  of  rules  and  the  historical  and 
philosophical  conditions,  a  possible  strategy  for  justifying  a  given  legal  rule  with 
                                                 
21 Marneffe 1998. 
22 Deneulin 2002, Buckley 2005a, b. In its most abstract form, perfectionism is a moral theory which 
views the human good (flourishing, excellence) as resting on human nature. Perfectionism has an ideal for 
each human: that he develops his nature. It accepts self-regarding moral duties, thus it tells us something 
about what we should choose for ourselves. In contrast to other moralities which hold that the good is 
subjective and thus exclude any claims about what humans ought to desire, perfectionism has an objective 
theory of the good. Nevertheless, for our purposes perfectionism is not so much relevant as a personal 
morality,  rather  as  a  political  one,  i.e.  a  normative  idea  about  the  aims  of  a  political  community, 
15 Cserne: Freedom of choice and paternalism in contract law
Produced by bepress.com, 2011  15
potential  reference  to  paternalism  is  the  following.  Paternalism  is  considered  as  a 
residual  category,  meaning  that  if  we  can  find  a  (possibly  implicit)  reason  for 
intervention in terms of a market failure or some third party effect, we should give 
priority to them and not attribute the regulation to paternalistic purposes. This strategy,  
of course, is mainly pragmatic and I only intend to apply it to the analysis of contract 
law not mentioning such areas as criminal or medical law (e.g. euthanasia) where both 
market failure and externality count for rather weak arguments, if at all. Still, even in 
the contractual area, as we shall see in part 4, there are possibly other reasons not falling 
into  the  category  of  externalities  or  market  failure  which  are  nevertheless  not 
paternalistic.  As  examples  moralism  or  other  reasons  relating  to  commonly  shared 
values might come into mind where it is not the subjective good of the individual (or 
other specific persons) but some objective value is served by the regulation.  
This  eliminative  strategy  is  helpful  both  in  making  clear  the  fundamental 
differences of paternalism and other reasons and in the pragmatic structuring of the 
arguments,  especially  in  part  3  where  the  different  ways  of  economic  modelling  of 
paternalism  will  be  discussed.  But  it  cannot  spare  us  the  direct  confrontation  with 
paternalism.  
 
2.3.6. Justification through redefinition?  
As noted above, the moral problem about paternalism can be seen as a conflict between 
freedom and benevolence. Still there are alternative views that redefine paternalism in 
such a way that it looks also normatively more acceptable. Some of these redefinitions 
are  especially  characteristic  for  the  economic  approach  to  paternalism,  so  we  will 
discuss them in detail in part 3. 
Maximising freedom. Horst Eidenmüller (along with less economically minded 
other German legal scholars, e.g. Michael Eberlin
23) considers paternalism justified only 
(or usually at least) if it promotes autonomy.
24 Freedom maximisation, the term used in 
Eberlin’s monograph for the same idea of autonomy-promoting paternalism, refers to 
the normative idea that the freedom of choice of an individual not only may but should 
                                                                                                                                               
eventually  formulated  in  legal  rules.  Specifically,  but  formally,  perfectionism  holds  that  “the  best 
government most promotes the perfection of all its citizens.” (Hurka 1993, 5.) 
23 See, e.g. Enderlein 1996. 
24 Eidenmüller 1995. 
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be restricted in the present if this promotes, on balance, his freedom in the future more. 
Of course, to make this idea any more than intuitive, we should be able to compare 
present and future freedom, a fortiori, to measure freedom. This problem will be dealt 
with in section 3.3. as well. 
  Collective  self-protection.  Eidenmüller  also  states  that  in  the  justification  of 
paternalism first we have to recur to general constitutional principles and “objective 
values” expressed in the constitution. Then in the second turn, in a non-legalistic sense, 
i.e. beyond the reference to the constitution the justification can be based mainly on 
some sort of hypothetical consent. More concretely, reference is made to weakness-of-
will and the institutions that are collectively imposed to protect against it. In this way, in 
a democratic state legal paternalism is nothing else but collective self-paternalism (of 
the majority). It is similar to what has been discussed in rational choice theory on the 
individual level with reference to the paradigmatic case of Ulysses and the sirens, i.e. 
the autonomous, rational side of the self defending itself against the irrational other.
25 
This line of reasoning seems promising for justifying certain limitations of freedom of 
choice and is not necessarily (logically) linked to hypothetical consent at all. 
In  my  view,  it  is  more  problematic  to  justify  paternalism  (especially  hard 
paternalism)  by  hypothetical  consent.
26  This  approach  is  debatable  on  a  level  more 
general than the problem of paternalism would suggest. The essence of the problem is 
that the hypothetical consent behind the rule runs, in case of hard paternalism, against 
the actual will of the subject. As it has been discussed widely in the literature on “social 
contract”, hypothetical consent as such does not live up to justify a rule or a regime, it is 
at best a metaphor referring to the public nature of arguments that rational individuals 
have reason to accept as justifying the rule. More specifically, if we take the fact of 
reasonable pluralism (Rawls) into account, it is rather improbable that there are a large 
number of hard paternalistic rules that can be backed by such hypothetical consent even 
in this reinterpreted sense: the very nature of the problem, namely that paternalism is 
about finding out (and enforcing against his will) what serves the good of a person, 
indicates that the core of the problem is “defined away” but remains unsolved if we 
                                                 
25 Cf. Elster 1984, 2000. 
26 This issue was discussed at the conference by my commentator, Prof. Dieter Schmidtchen. At this point 
I only present the sketch of the argument why I do not think this line of justification workable.  
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assess paternalism in terms of a hypothetical consent.
27 
 
2.4. Two specificities of legal paternalism 
2.4.1. Over-inclusiveness and redistribution  
Legal paternalism has to deal with a specific problem worth mentioning. Additional to 
the justification of the limitation of freedom in individual cases, the legal nature of 
paternalism, i.e. that it is formulated in general rules is problematic as well. Thus even if 
it might be justified to interfere in individual cases, the general rule would diminish the 
freedom of those who do not need to be assisted. This problem of the over-inclusiveness 
of rules vis-à-vis their background justification is the consequence of the generality of 
rules when the cases (subjects) are heterogeneous.
28 It is not unknown in the law and 
economics literature either. In a sense, it is a special case of how to find the optimal mix 
of rules and standards (or the division of labour between legislation and the judiciary) in 
regulation.  In  another  sense,  it  points  to  the  redistributive  consequences  of 
paternalism.
29  Namely,  the  costs  of  paternalistic  rules  are  born  by  the  rational 
individuals who do not need the assistance of the law but are actually impeded by it to 
carry out their actions as they want.  
 
2.4.2. Uniformed regulator 
There is a further instrumentalist argument against all sorts of paternalism which is 
independent of the Mill-Feinberg line of autonomy-based reasoning but, to be sure, used 
by libertarian authors as well. Thus, following the Hayekian line of arguments about the 
dispersed  nature  of  knowledge  in  society,  serious  doubts  can  be  raised  about  the 
superior knowledge of the pater. To put it very simply, the argument is that even if the 
paternalist legislator is  benevolent, he is possibly ignorant  about what  promotes the 
good (well-being, happiness etc.) of the paternalised individuals. This argument is quite 
strong and it has bite against a much wider class of reasons than paternalism. In its 
extreme form, it works against all non-spontaneous, deliberate, planned law and rule 
governing  the  behaviour  of  others;  though  in  this  unqualified  form  and  being  not 
                                                 
27 This argument should be more elaborated on. 
28 The classic literature on the topic is Schauer 1991. See also Schauer 2003. 
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specific, its relevance is rather limited at this point. Still in part 3 and 4 we shall come 
across similar arguments. 
 
2.5. Freedom of contract 
Freedom of contract is an ideologically charged notion which may attract strongly-held 
political beliefs but which eludes the interest of the lawyer in his everyday work for the 
most part. Nevertheless, the question of freedom of choice and its limits have crucial 
importance  in  law,  especially  contract  law.  For  instance,  the  validity  of  a  contract, 
liability  and  remedies  are  often  conditional  on  the  (in)voluntariness  of  one  party’s 
action. There are also several typical cases when modern legal regimes set limits on the 
general  principle  of  freedom  of  contract,  for  good  or  wrong  reasons  (labour  law, 
consumer protection etc.). Paternalism is arguably one of these reasons. 
Let’s  see  briefly  how  freedom  of  contract  is  treated  in  moral  and  legal 
philosophy. Behind the law of contracts, a central subject area of private law lays a 
broad set of economic, social and political values that define the role of markets in 
modern developed countries. But markets are not the sole mode of social organisation. 
As Heilbroner argues, societies organise production and distribution basically through 
three  institutions:  tradition  (social  conventions  and  status),  command  (centralised 
information  gathering  and  processing  and  coercion)  and  market  (decentralised 
decisions). Most of the societies usually combine all these three organisational modes. 
At the same time a modern developed society, mainly based on market-type production 
and distribution has to cope with certain backdrops of the market economy relative to 
the two other modes of social organisation (such as the potential for dramatic shifts in 
consumption  and  production,  the  destabilisation  of  personal,  social  and  communal 
relationships,  and  a  significant  degree  of  inequality).  Despite  a  relatively  wide 
consensus  in  favour  of  economic  liberalism  and  the  market  economy,  there  remain 
many troubling and potentially divisive normative issues about the extent of markets 
and freedom of contract. 
Michael  Trebilcock  calls  this  consensus,  together  with  its  theoretical 
underpinnings  the  private  ordering  paradigm.  In  neo-classical  economics  this 
"predilection for private ordering over collective decision-making is based on a simple 
                                                                                                                                               
29 See Mitchell 2005. 
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(perhaps  simple-minded)  premise:  if  two  parties  are  to  be  observed  entering  into  a 
voluntary private exchange, the presumption must be that both feel the exchange is 
likely to make them better off, otherwise they would not have entered into it."
30 To 
rebut  this  presumption,  the  economist  has  to  refer  either  to  contracting  failures  or 
market failures. These constitute (from an economic perspective) the reasons for the 
limits of freedom of contract. Or, as Milton Friedman has put it: “The possibility of 
coordination through voluntary  cooperation rests on the elementary –  yet frequently 
denied  –  proposition  that  both  parties  to  an  economic  transaction  benefit  from  it, 
provided the transaction is bilaterally voluntary and informed.”
31 
Besides the consequentialist arguments used in economics there are, as we have 
already referred to it, non-economic justifications for the primacy of private ordering 
(and the rejection of paternalism) which are based on individual autonomy (negative 
liberty) as a paramount social value. These liberal theories see the law of contracts as a 
guarantee of individual autonomy. On the other hand, there are some other stances of 
political philosophy which are more ambivalent toward freedom of contract, such as 
theories based on the positive (affirmative) concept of liberty which are concerned with 
the fairness of distribution of welfare (equality) in society; and communitarianism that 
emphasises the essentially social nature of man (fraternity). 
These four theories about freedom of contract partly cohere and converge but 
partly contradict each other. To be able to construct a normative theory of the law of 
contracts  and  deduce  arguments  from  it  for  or  against  certain  limits  of  freedom  of 
contract, the complex relationship “between autonomy values and welfare (end-state) 
values (efficiency, utility, equality, community)” shall be cleared.
32 If we explore the 
congruencies and conflicts between current moral and political philosophies and their 
normative  implications  regarding  the  fine  details  of  the  law  of  contracts  and  then 
contrast them with our moral intuition and legal rules in force, we will probably come to 
the conclusion that neither autonomy-based theories nor different sorts of utilitarianism 
nor communitarianism can offer  alone a coherent theory about freedom of contract. 
This, of course, does not come as a surprise – the question is rather whether there is a 
                                                 
30 Trebilcock 1993, 7. 
31 Friedman 1962, 13. 
32 Treilcock 1993, 21. As an ambitious recent meta-theoretical attempt to integrate welfare-based and 
autonomy-based theories of contract, see Kraus 2002. For an argument that law and economics offers the 
only acceptable theory of contract see Buckley 2005a.  
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reasonably large range of overlapping consensus between there theories. For our present 
purposes, it is important to see that the “convergence claim” (i.e. that a market ordering 
and  freedom  of  contract  simultaneously  promote  individual  autonomy  and  social 
welfare) may be true in certain contexts but it is not robust enough to be true in general. 
An additional lesson, which has to be elaborated more in the thesis, is that there are 
problems (market failures) which cannot be appropriately addressed judicially, i.e. in a 
contract law setting where private law constrains the freedom of contract. This can be 
thus  an  argument  for  a  mix  of  policy  instruments.
33  In  general,  the  plurality  of  the 
theories  represents  confronting  purposes  which,  in  turn  can  be  achieved  only  by  a 
plurality of institutions. 
 
3. Analysis of paternalism with economic tools: mainstream 
and others 
Freedom  of  contract  and  paternalism  are  perhaps  too  general  issues  to  be  very 
commonly treated in law and economics in this way, but they are especially interesting 
as they point to the limits of economic methods in the social scientific research of legal 
problems. In this sense, the subject raises a number of methodological problems for 
economics. More precisely, in the analysis of legal paternalism my starting point is the 
economic literature on (contract) law based on rational choice methodology. But as the 
findings of this branch of literature are rather unsatisfying when applied to the problem 
of paternalism, the research methods themselves come into focus – at least in this part 
of my work. 
 
3.1. Paternalism in the mainstream 
3.1.1. “Consumer sovereignty”  
Utilitarianism or welfarism, arguably (in one form or another) the principal background 
philosophy  of  contemporary  economics  is  used  to  be  criticised  on  the  basis  that  it 
accepts existing preferences as given, it does not offer “ethical criteria for disqualifying 
morally  offensive,  self-destructive,  or  irrational  preferences  as  unworthy  of 
recognition.” If, on the contrary, economic theory acknowledges some exceptions, as it 
                                                 
33 Treilcock 1993, 248–261. 
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usually  does  (e.g.  in  case  of  minors  or  mental  incompetents)  then  “some  theory  of 
paternalism is required, the contours of which are not readily suggested by the private 
ordering paradigm itself.”
34 
Of course, when we come about with suggestions for intervention etc. we rely 
not only on a standard of voluntariness but also on a standard of rationality, according 
to  which  weakness  of  will,  sour  grape  mechanism  etc.  are  irrational  behavioural 
patterns. This strategy implies, however that we are measuring real world individuals on 
a kind of artificial scale. We are rather speaking about abstract subjects of a certain 
quality: rationality as put equal to autonomy (one’s preferences are to be respected in 
any case if they reflect his desires). Now, this autonomous self can be in conflict with 
the other features of the very same person, or  in other terms, with different selves. 
Beside other problems with multiple self models applied in law, here is one important 
from a methodological viewpoint. It is not evident which features belong to this abstract 
person  and  what  counts  for  an  anomaly  that  needs  or  justifies  a  cure.  This  is  an 
everyday  methodological  problem  in  economics.  E.g.  it  is  not  clear  if  extreme  risk 
aversion is to be corrected for or an individual’s risk attitude is just a datum which 
cannot be the object of regulation, manipulation etc. as belonging to the preference 
structure of the person making the decision. In sum, if the only basis for evaluating 
actions,  rules,  policies  etc.  are  revealed  preferences,  it  leads  both  to  normative  and 
conceptual problems. More importantly, it makes hard to understand the problem of 
paternalism. 
 
3.1.2. Justifying paternalism “by eliminative redefinition”: ad hoc 
amendments 
The rather meagre body of systematic economically-minded literature on paternalism
35 
tries to justify paternalism roughly in the following way. For some cases paternalism is 
redefined or “explained away” by showing that a given policy can be justified by (1) 
externalities or (2) market failures. For instance in case of informational asymmetries 
we have to deal with some boundary cases of paternalism and correction of a market 
failure.  In  still  other  cases,  consumer  sovereignty  is  questioned  by  introducing  the 
                                                 
34 Treilcock 1993, 21. 
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concept of (3) merit wants and merit goods,
36  i.e. formally modelling the individuals’ 
utility function that the policy maker has to maximise differently from  the way the 
individual perceives it. Still other models introduce specific (ad hoc) assumptions about 
the preference structure of the individuals, such as (4) path-dependent preferences, (5) 
dynamic inconsistency, or (6) multiple self models. There are finally such heterodox 
approaches that want to remedy the simplistic reduction of every normative instance to 
preferences over outcomes by (7) stressing the difference between what one desires vs. 
what one has reason to value, or by (8) highlighting the need for including freedom 
and/or fairness in the economic models.
37 
As the concept of paternalism is neither legal nor economic, it should not come 
as  a  surprise,  that  (as  noted  above  in  sec.  2.1.1.)  both  lawyers  translate  it  to  their 
traditional doctrinal concepts and economists explain it away or model it in a more or 
less  ad  hoc  way.  This  redefinition  makes  possible  to  use  the  standard  tools  of  the 
discipline  to  handle  a  problem  originally  formulated  in  another  language.  Thus  the 
eliminative redefinition of paternalism in economics is arguably the natural way to treat 
the substantive problem indicated by the concept. Indeed, at first glance it is relatively 
easy to incorporate paternalism in mainstream economic analysis: we just have to define 
specific preferences and/or specific informational imperfections and asymmetries.  
 
3.1.2. Need for methodological change? 
Still on a more general methodological level this is not unproblematic. It is deviant (the 
basic  premise  of  consumer  sovereignty  or  the  ultimate  decisiveness  of  (revealed) 
individual preferences is given up) and unknown (what should replace it). Although 
ultimately it can only be decided case by case which way of modelling is to be taken, I 
think that the tools recently developed within two branches of economics can contribute 
to  a  new  perspective  on  the  question  of  freedom  of  contract  and  paternalism.  This 
perspective  is  potentially  more  coherent  and  fruitful  than  we  currently  have  in 
economics. 
As for the substantive questions at issue, by confronting economic arguments 
                                                                                                                                               
35  E.g.  Burrows  1993,  1995,  Zamir  1998.  On  paternalism  in  contract  law,  see  also  Kennedy  1982, 
Kronman 1982, Spergel 1988. 
36 See e.g. the still very illuminating summary article by Head 1966. 
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with  philosophical  and  jurisprudential  considerations,  I  suggest  modifying  the 
traditional  law  and  economics  arguments  about  paternalism  in  two  ways:  (1)  the 
empirical findings of behavioural economics offer a more realistic view of the situations 
susceptible  for  paternalistic  intervention,  (2)  the  analytical  tools  of  the  freedom-of- 
choice literature help to clarify the non-welfarist dimension of the problem. These two 
schools are different concerning their theoretical background but their implications for 
contract law might complement each other. 
On a more concrete level, as Russell Korobkin argued in a recent paper,
38 if our 
purpose  is  to  come  up  with  legal  policy  recommendations,  we  have  to  decide 
pragmatically,  in  each  concrete  case,  whether  the  rational-choice  or  the  behavioural 
theory offers a more plausible explanation of the phenomena analysed. Thus one way to 
deal  with  paternalism  is  by  using  specific  assumptions  in  a  traditional  framework. 
Alternatively,  we  can  rely  on  the  emerging  literature  of  behavioural  (law  and) 
economics.  In any case, it is primarily the service of psychologists and behavioural 
scientists to have systematically analysed the possible target situations of paternalism. 
 
3.2. Behavioural law and economics 
3.2.1. Rationality 
In  light  of  this,  in  analysing  paternalism  in  contract  law  I  draw  on  findings  of 
behavioural  law  and  economics  about  how  people  behave  in  front  of  legal  rules  in 
experimental or real world settings. Here, the assumptions concerning the rationality of 
individual choice have an important but limited role. Without going into details now, I 
only  mention  that  to  use  the  assumptions  of  instrumental  rationality  and  utility 
maximisation in modelling in an explanatory science only makes sense as long as the 
hypothesis that people in real world settings do indeed behave according to these rules, 
has some plausibility. In other terms, rational choice theory is a normative theory about 
how a rational individual should decide and choose. The use of these models in an 
explanatory  context  is  thus  “parasitic”
39,  i.e.  secondary  to  its  role  as  a  normative 
standard and conditional on it. If we want to understand and explain how real-world 
                                                                                                                                               
37 In the thesis, these economic conceptualisations of paternalism shall be analysed in detail. 
38 Korobkin 2004. 
39 See Sen 2002, 43. 
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people  behave  in  front  of  law  we  have  to  draw,  at  least  in  some  contexts  on  non-
standard  economic  models  of  individual  decision-making,  including  bounded  and 
biased instrumental rationality or expressive rationality.
40  
Rationality as such has a strong place in social science. But rationality is defined 
in behavioural law and economics at most negatively, as the absence of Savage-type 
rationality. Behavioural law and economics does not rest on a single theory or definition 
of bounded rationality that would allow the decisions of the contracting parties to be 
axiomatised. In this matter the theory remains inductive: there are specific behavioural 
regularities which are highly relevant for us, even if we cannot fully explain them. 
 
3.2.2. Relevance for contract law 
Why and how can thus behavioural decision theory be interesting for the economic 
analysis  of  contract  law?  The  empirical  findings  of  behavioural  economics  on  the 
cognitive  characteristics  of  contracting  parties  are  abundant  and  relatively  widely 
known.  Intuitively,  these  well-documented  and  systematic  cognitive  deficiencies  of 
individuals may justify some (soft) paternalism in certain contractual contexts. Thus a 
careful  choice  of  potentially  sticky  default  rules,
41  the  imposition  of  mandatory 
warnings or cooling-off periods are some forms that seem justified in light of these 
results.  In  general,  behavioural  law  and  economics  argues  for  a  change  from  anti-
paternalism  to  anti-anti-paternalism,  i.e.  a  critical,  qualified  and  limited  paternalism 
which takes into consideration that not only (at least one of) the contracting individuals 




3.2.3. Problems with the behavioural approach 
Several proponents of behavioural law  and  economics refer to the  well-documented 
                                                 
40 One short remark on bounded rationality is in place. Here not the more specific ideas of Herbert Simon 
about satisfying behaviour etc. are meant (there are good arguments that this is one very specific model 
and there is no empirical support that it would be correct context-independently, in a wide range of real 
world issues) but  the  more  general (and thus less precise) idea that  human behaviour systematically 
deviates from the standard models of rational choice. 
41 For a useful overview of the theories explaining this stickiness see Ben-Shahar – Pottow 2005. 
42 Jolls et al., 2000. A useful German summary of the literature is Englerth 2004. 
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deficiencies of human rationality
43 which per se, in their view, justify paternalism or at 
least anti-anti-paternalism. But this literature is often not explicit about the normative 
issues involved in the problem of paternalism or tries to reduce them to a welfarist 
calculus of costs and benefits. In the literature informed by rational choice theory, there 
is a conceptualisation of paternalism (different from the usual philosophical approach 
mentioned above) which treats the question of paternalism as a multiple self problem or 
even an ‘intra-personal externality problem’. In certain cases of soft paternalism (i.e. 
when the paternalised subject is not a fully competent and fully informed individual), it 
is possible to argue that by imposing on him we defend his true self against weakness of 
will or mistake etc. E.g. those who argue for ‘asymmetric’ paternalism on a behavioural 
economic  basis,
44  tend  to  compare  the  real  world  agents  with  the  fully  rational 
individual (assumed in orthodox economic models) and to say that bounded rationality 
is something which can be justifiably regulated in a similar way as externalities. Here, 
of course, we have, first, to suppose the existence of a true ‘inner self’ characterised by 
such  desires  and  beliefs  which  are  undisputed,  accepted  as  rational  (or  at  least  not 
irrational in a way requiring intervention) and, second, to explain the behaviour of real 
world individuals as cases when this inner self falls prey to certain anomalies.  
As already mentioned, it is not always easy to tell what is given and part of the 
autonomous  self  and  what  is  potential  subject  to  paternalistic  correction.  Attitudes 
toward risk, for instance, are usually taken as datum. But in the experimental results we 
see that these attitudes are context-dependent, differ for gains and losses, and depend 
also on the amount of value at stake – the cognitive background of risk perception is 
thus too complex to allow for an easy conclusion. 
  There  is  a  further  problem  with  this  sort  of  definition  of  paternalism.  If 
consumers had the choice between possible default rules, mandatory warnings, cooling-
off  periods  (these  are  some  typical  forms  of  rules  suggested  by  the  adherents  of 
‘asymmetric  paternalism’)  in  an  individual  manner,  maybe  they  would  want  some 
protective rules for themselves. Then the regulation cannot, without qualification, be 
called paternalistic. It is rather the expression of a hypothetical consent or the collective 
self-protection of the boundedly rational individuals against their own weakness of will, 
etc. This reformulation of the paternalistic rules as the result of collective self-protection 
                                                 
43 I refer here to the literature on hindsight bias, availability heuristics, framing effect, prospect theory etc.  
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could  illustrate  the  more  general  point  that  not  every  legal  regulation  intending  to 
promote or defend consumers’ interest can be called paternalistic just because of this 
purpose. 
The behavioural literature often reflects a strong and devoted antipathy towards 
philosophical  discussion  of  the  problems  of  paternalism.  They  claim  to  be  the 
representatives of ‘pure science’, offering hard empirical facts and being able to cut 
through dusty disputes about “faith” by pointing at empirical facts.
45 I think this attitude 
is rather unfortunate. Empirical research is crucial in answering questions about the best 
possible way to design  legal rules of paternalism and even in the discussion of the 
reasons for paternalism.
46 But this literature also uses a normative benchmark, namely 
that of welfare, measured in an acknowledgedly simplistic way by cost and benefits.
47 
 
3.2.4. Asymmetric paternalism 
More  precisely,  it  is  argued  that  ‘asymmetric  paternalism’  is  justified  (in  a 
firm/consumers setting) if 
 
(p * B) – [(1-p) * C] – I + ∆∏ > 0, 
 
where B denotes the net benefits to boundedly rational agents, C is the net costs to 
rational agents, I stands for the implementation costs, ∆∏ denotes the change in firms’ 
profits,  and  p  is  the  fraction  of  consumers  who  are  boundedly  rational  (all  other 
consumers  are  supposed  to  be  fully  rational).  Thus  “a  policy  is  asymmetrically 
paternalistic if it creates large benefits for those people who are boundedly rational 
while imposing little or no harm on those who are fully rational.” 
  This formula, of course, only illustrates the structure of the problem of legal 
paternalism.  It  is  not  the  purpose  to  measure  and  quantify  these  variables  but  to 
highlight  who  are  the  beneficiaries  and  who  bear  the  costs  of  a  paternalistic 
intervention. Still, these trade-offs are not one-dimensional. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
44 Camerer et al. 2003. See also Rachlinsky 2003, Sunstein – Thaler 2003a, b, Mitchell 2005. 
45 Camerer et alii 2003, 1222. 
46 On the empirical research in contract law scholarship see Korobkin 2002. 
47 Camerer et alii 2003, 1219. 
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3.3. Freedom of choice: the non-welfarist dimension of paternalism 
Even if we put aside the question whether this kind of literature can be successful in 
reducing the problem to an issue of facts, i.e. whether and how the method of only using 
arguments about costs and benefits can be justified, it is important to see that the costs 
(and  arguably  some  of  the  benefits)  of  paternalism  are  to  be  measured  in  terms  of 
freedom of choice and opportunities, where not only the desirability of the outcomes but 
also the value of the very act of making a free choice matters. Originating from A. Sen’s 
article on the impossibility of a Paretian liberal,
48 there is now an emerging branch of 
social choice theory literature dealing with this dimension of freedom of choice. 
As noted above, the traditional economic approach to freedom of contract is an 
unreflected mixture of liberalism and utilitarianism and as such it cannot handle the 
problem where these two principles are in conflict. Thus also on a more abstract level 
the potential conflict of wealth-maximisation and autonomy draws attention to the non-
welfarist dimension of the problem of paternalism. 
  The philosophical literature on autonomy, liberty, and paternalism often lacks 
the conceptual rigour or the degree of formalisation which would make the arguments 
directly  accessible  for  the  economic  analysis.  And  conversely,  economists  cannot 
include  relevant  and  important  philosophical  ideas  in  their  analysis  as  long  as  they 
cannot  translate  them  to  their  own  language.  Hence  the  relevance  of  the  economic 
analysis of freedom of choice and the use of social choice theory to formalise, measure 
and evaluate freedom of choice.
49 Authors of the freedom of choice literature, besides 
searching for a formal  method to measure freedom of choice, usually  argue for the 
importance of non-welfarist measures of well-being, including freedom. This literature 
treats paternalism, if at all, as a restriction of autonomy and freedom and evaluates it in 
a clearly negative way. As I have indicated above, even if this involves a pragmatic 
compromise between freedom and other values, the unqualified anti-paternalism has to 
be abandoned. Still, the insights of the economics of freedom of choice are crucial in 
making  possible  to  analyse  the  issues  about  freedom  in  a  conceptually  clear  and 
rigorous way. 
 
                                                 
48 Sen 1970. 
49 Cf. Van Hees, 2004, Sugden 1998. 
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3.4. The lesson of part three 
In sum, the lesson of part 3 is this: if we want to analyse the problem of paternalism in 
contract law economically while not neglecting the questions of autonomy involved, we 
should adapt the methodology of standard law and economics scholarship to the object 
under study. Still, how to do this more precisely cannot be decided in abstracto. It is to 
be found out during the very process of the analysis of specific contractual rules which 
is still ahead. 
 
4. The proper role of paternalism in contract regulation 
4.1. The legal policy perspective 
By legal policy I mean a more or less coherent system of proposals for reforming (or 
interpreting) legal rules. The basic idea behind such proposals is that law should fulfil 
certain hypothetically or tacitly accepted normative criteria. In the law and economics 
literature (Pareto or Kaldor-Hicks) efficiency is the most important among them. This 
part of the thesis, following a policy perspective is concerned with some concrete rules 
in contract law from a practical evaluative point of view. More specifically, I will deal 
with questions about the optimal amount of paternalistic regulation in contract law and 
then make proposals how to improve them. This level of analysis is, to be noted, based 
on the justification of paternalism (“what are the reasons for leaving people freedom of 
choice  or  to  intervene  paternalistically?”)  and  some  empirical  facts  or  hypotheses 
(“what are the effects of freedom of choice in contract law, what is to be expected as the 
result of legislative intervention?”) and combines them in order to contribute to the legal 
policy discourse about the best legal means to achieve some (at this level) given goals. 
 
4.2. The economics of contracts vs. the economics of contract law 
The economic analysis of contracts and the economic analysis of contract law are two 
different  research  areas.  The  second  is  much  more  specific,  relates  mainly  to  the 
institutional (legal) framework in which transactions, governed by contracts, take place. 
But the two areas are not in a simple whole and part relation because, normatively, one 
objective of legal scholarship is to design contract law in such a way as to influence the 
contracting parties in a certain direction or at least to offer a framework within which 
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they operate. 
What  is  then  the  role  of  contract  law  from  an  economic  perspective?
50  In 
general, it facilitates the voluntary (and well-informed) exchange of well-defined and 
exclusive  private  property  rights.  First,  it  is  a  “check  on  opportunism  in  non-
simultaneous exchanges by ensuring that the first mover, in terms of performance, does 
not run the risk of defection, rather than co-operation, by the second mover.”
51 Second, 
it reduces transaction costs. Third, it provides a set of default or background rules where 
the terms of a contract are incomplete. Fourth, it distinguishes welfare-enhancing and 
welfare-reducing exchanges. 
 
4.3. The specificity of contract law with respect to paternalism 
There is some specificity of contract law with respect to paternalism. It is an area where, 
as a general rule, a private ordering, namely the provisions of their contract apply to the 
individuals. Following the principle of freedom of contract, the state only enforces the 
promises the parties make to each other. Thus the general libertarian claim that law as 
such is interfering with individual autonomy and therefore is essentially paternalistic 
possibly does not apply to contract law. 
 
4.3.1. Two forms of contract regulation 
Another specificity in  contract law is that here paternalism can be observed in two 
different  forms. First, it may be  found in regulation by legislative or  administrative 
rules, formulated in general terms and applicable to every individual case uniformly. 
These rules lie, structurally or doctrinally, often outside of traditional body of contract 
law  (e.g.  in  labour  law,  administrative  law.  etc.)  even  if  they  restrict  the  power  of 
individuals to bind enforceable contracts. (On the relevance of this doctrinal separation, 
see the next sec.) 
On  the  other  hand,  there  are  several  contract  law  doctrines  which  can  be 
interpreted  as  motivated  by  paternalism.  These  are  usually  formulated  as  vague 
                                                 
50 The economic literature on contract law is extensive. For an excellent recent summary of the standard 
law and economics view see Shavell 2003. This kind of analysis also fits under the heading contract 
regulation. On this see Hadfield 2005, Rubin 2005, Schwartz 2000, Schwartz – Scott 2003. On contract 
economics, see e.g. Werin – Wijkander 1992. 
51 Treilcock 1993, 16. 
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standards, leaving a relatively wide scope of discretion to the judiciary. For instance, it 
is for the judge to determine in individual cases whether a certain provision of a contract 
is “unconscionable”, “immoral” or “grossly unfair”.  
To be sure, we face the usual trade-off implied by standards here. If the question 
of  the  legality  (enforceability)  of  a  contract  term  is  left  to  ex  post  case-by-case 
determination, then the over- and under-inclusiveness of a general rule is avoided at the 
price of more ex post regulation by judges. 
 
4.3.2. The limited importance of doctrinal boundaries 
From a theoretical (either philosophical or economic) perspective, the actual doctrinal 
boundaries of contract law look accidental, if not irrelevant. For a contract theory, it is 
the  purpose  (or  function  or  point)  of  a  certain  institution  (e.g.  making  binding  and 
enforceable  promises  possible)  and  the  regulation  thereof  which  matters.  Thus 
irrespective  of  the  reason  why  a  given  theory  favours  or  would  limit  contractual 
freedom (autonomy, happiness, efficiency, etc.), the rules that are relevant for such a 
theory often lie outside contract law in a doctrinal sense. It is e.g. administrative or 
criminal law that regulates or forbids the marketing and/or purchase of certain goods. 
To be sure, the contract law part of civil codes usually refers to these limitations by 
declaring  illegal  contractual  terms  invalid  (“contracts  forbidden  by  statute”).
52  Also 
labour  law,  which  is  often  considered  as  a  separate  field  of  law,  includes  a  lot  of 
arguably paternalistic rules. But on the top of that, labour contracts are regulated heavily 
for occupational safety reasons via rules of administrative law. 
During the 20
th century there has been a tendency in civil law countries to keep 
their codes and the principle of freedom of contract relatively unchanged, and introduce 
“material”  limitations  to  it  behind  this  “formalistic”  liberal  façade.  To  be  sure,  the 
traditional rules on mistake, fraud, duress, incapacity etc. where present as they seemed 
to fit with a contract theory based on will, or at least not to raise big problems. Later on, 
the socially motivated legislation aiming at protecting the employee, the consumer etc. 
has led to the enactment of a large body of rules which could not fit easily within the 
classical doctrines. 
In the last decades, the European legislation on consumer protection has led to a 
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large body of rules, the doctrinal position of which is not uniform in the member states. 
Some have integrated these rules fully in their civil codes, others keep them separate. 
All this does not matter significantly for a non-doctrinal analysis. But it points to a 
related question about the uniform or segmented regulation of contracts.  
 
4.3.3. Doctrinal Segmentation? Four categories of contract 
It is an interesting question also for paternalism whether there are systematic differences 
between contracting parties that make segmentation and thus a differentiated regulation 
of contracts reasonable. In a recent article Robert Scott and Alan Schwartz argue (by 
reformulating a widely used intuitive categorization) that four different types of contract 
(transaction) should be distinguished:
53 
(1) a firm sells to another firm 
(2) an individual sells to another individual 
(3) a firm sells to an individual 
(4) an individual sells to a firm. 
Category 1 is the area of commercial or business law (with some qualifications about 
the definition of the firm they stress), category 2 contracts are primarily regulated by 
family law and property law, category 3 contracts “are primarily regulated by consumer 
protection law, real property law (mostly leases), and the securities law, while category 
4  is  mainly  the  domain  of  labour  law.  Their  claim  is  that  contract  law  should  be 
different,  thus  involve  different  extent  of  paternalism  for  these  categories  of 
transactions.      
In this light it is interesting that for instance the contract law part of the new 
Hungarian Civil Code is designed acknowledgedly primarily for business to business 
transactions  (category  1).  Thus  the  rules  are  supposed  to  be  adapted  to  commercial 
settings  and  repeat  players.  One-shot  contracts  among  inexperienced  private  parties 
(category 2) are handled as exceptions. Apart from these two groups of contract rules a 
relatively large body of special regulations is dealing with consumer contracts, by way 
of  implementation  of  the  respective  EU  directives  (category  3).  This  rather  formal 
typology  suggests  that  there  are  at  least  three  different  contexts  where  the  role  of 
                                                                                                                                               
52 Cf. Beale 2004, ch 3.1., 295-332. 
53 Schwartz – Scott 2003, 544. 
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paternalism should differ. But it also raises the question whether this it’s the optimal 
degree of precision for the tailoring of contract law rules when the contracting parties 
are heterogeneous with regard to business expertise, cognitive abilities etc. 
 
4.4. Non-paternalist reasons for limiting freedom of contract 
As mentioned before, there are a few concurrent justifications beside paternalism for 
limiting  freedom  of  contract  which  are  not  always  easily  distinguishable  from  each 
other or eventually from paternalism. In other terms, even by following the eliminative 
strategy  there  are  boundary  cases.  Beside  that,  sometimes  the  justification  for 
intervention is only potentially paternalistic. Being bound to formulate general rules 
despite  the  uncertainty  about  the  distribution  of  competence,  well-informedness  etc. 
among  individuals  in  a  given  community,  the  lawmaker  decides  not  to  enforce,  or 
enforce  on  different  terms  contracts  falling  in  certain  predetermined  categories: 
coercion, fraud, restraint of trade, etc. Thus these doctrines are potentially paternalistic. 
 
4.4.1. Negative externality (harm and offence)  
In the contractual context, externalities roughly mean imposition of costs or benefits 
from  a  particular  exchange  transaction  on  non-consenting  third  parties.  Positive 
externalities  pose  incentive  problems,  leading  to  suboptimal  quantity  of  the  good 
(transaction)  in  question.  Negative  externalities  are  arguably  more  important  with 
respect to freedom of contract. Autonomy-based theories formulate the same negative 
effect under the name ‘harm’ (or, within another category of Joel Feinberg’s scheme: 
‘offence’).  The  crucial  conceptual  problem  here  is  that  third-party  effects  (negative 
externalities in economics, harm in liberal theories) are pervasive. If all these effects 
should count in prohibiting the exchange process or in justifying constraints upon it, 
freedom of contract would be largely at an end. Once one moves beyond rather tangible 
harms to third parties, many activities might be viewed as generating some externality 
(by imposing costs on dependants, the social welfare system or the public health care 
system as we have seen above in sec. 2.3.1.), including inadequate dietary or exercise 
regimens, excessively stressful work habits or risky leisure activities. As we have seen, 
economists  are  still  willing  to  refer  to  externalities  (burdens  for  the  social  security 
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system)  in  order  to  justify  laws  which  on  their  face  are  paternalistic  (e.g.  safety 
measures). 
 
4.4.2. Coercion  
The seemingly simple question of what constitutes voluntary consent to a transaction is 
actually a serious conceptual problem. Suppose there is full information, no cognitive 
deficiencies and the contract is complete. The question is then, whether the constrained 
choice  of  a  party  renders  his  consent  involuntary  nevertheless.  In  one  sense,  all 
contracts are “coerced” because of the scarcity of resources and opportunities. But on 
the  other  side,  except  for  extreme  cases  (actual  physical  force,  torture  or  hypnotic 
trance) almost every exchange can be viewed as voluntary (coactus tamen volui).
54 
Rights theorists define coercion by drawing a basic distinction between threats 
and offers. Threats reduce the possibilities open to the recipient of the proposal, whereas 
offers  expand  them.
55  The  difficulties  arise,  however,  in  specifying  the  offeree’s 
baseline, against which the offer is to be measured. This measure is not self-evident. It 
may be statistical (what he might reasonably expect), phenomenological (what he in fact 
expects), or moral (what he is entitled to expect). Thus “the distinction between threats 
and offers depends on whether it is possible to fix a conception of what is right and 
what  is  wrong,  and  to  determine  what  rights  people  have  in  contractual  relations 
independent of whether their contracts should be enforced.”
56  
There  are  other  approaches  to  contractual  coercion,  elaborated  e.g.  from  a 
Hegelian  or  an  Aristotelian  perspective  which  are  based  on  different  theories  of 
substantive fairness, or still others that are based on hypothetical, rather than actual 
consent  and  thus  invert  the  conventional  arguments  of  economists  for  voluntary 
exchanges, mentioned above in sec. 2.5. (While there voluntariness implies welfare-
improvement,  here  the  other  way  around).  The  implications  of  these  theories  for 
different cases of constrained choice diverge.
57 Still, as long as they justify the non-
                                                 
54 This problem has already been discussed by Aristotle, see Nicomachean Ethics, 1110a-b. 
55 See Nozick 1997. 
56 Trebilcock 1993, 80. 
57 Trebilcock construes seven cases and demonstrate the implications of the different theories. (1) The 
highwayman case (creation and exploitation of life-threatening risks: a highwayman or mugger holds up a 
passer-by confronting him with the proposition: ‘Your money or your life’ and the passer-by commits 
himself to hand over the money). (2) The tug and foundering ship case (exploitation but not creation of 
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enforcement  of  a  coerced  contract,  they  do  that  for  reasons  which  are  essentially 
different from paternalism, as they are not constraining but respecting the free will of 
the person, with freedom defined here as lack of coercion. 
 
4.5. Prima facie paternalistic contract doctrines 
4.5.1. Imperfect information  
Contract law deals with several typical situations where at least one contractual party 
has imperfect information. Both asymmetric and symmetric information imperfections 
are possible cases for paternalistic intervention. 
In general, the problem of asymmetric information is not easily distinguished 
from  paternalism.  The  question  here  is:  how  much  information  is  required  for  the 
exercise of an autonomous choice. Or stated differently, if one party to a contract is 
substantially less well informed about some aspect of the subject matter than the other, 
should contracts be unenforced or enforced on different terms, on that account. The 
problem is, of course, that information is almost always imperfect. 
In terms of the doctrines of common law these information failure cases include 
fraud,  negligent  misrepresentation,  innocent  misrepresentation  and  material  non-
disclosure.  In  behavioural  terms,  information  processing  disabilities  or  cognitive 
deficiencies  ("transactional  incapacity"  and  "unfair  persuasion")  also  belong  here, 
potentially along with the entire issue of standard form contracts. Here, however, the 
economic analysis has made clear the issues involved without recurring to paternalism. 
Symmetric  information  imperfections  correspond  to  the  domain  of  contract 
                                                                                                                                               
life-threatening risks: a third party encounters the highwayman and the passer-by before the transaction is 
consummated and offers to rescue the passer-by for all his money, less one dollar. Or imagine the same 
situation  between  a  foundering  ship  on  the  stormy  sea  and  a  rescuing  tug).  (3)  The  dry  wells  case 
(exploitation but not creation of life-threatening risks with one supplier and many bidders: in a remote 
rural area all wells except from A’s dry up in a drought and A auctions off drinking water to desperate 
inhabitants for large percentages of their wealth. Or, the same sea situation with several ships and one 
rescuer). (4) The Penny Black case (exploitation but not creation of non-life-threatening situations: A 
comes across a rare stamp in his aunt’s attic and sells it either to B exploiting his idiosyncratic intense 
preferences or through a Sotheby’s auction to the highest bidder). (5) The lecherous millionaire case (A 
agrees  to  pay  for  a  costly  medical  treatment  of  B’s  child  [or  offers  her  an  academic  position  or  a 
promotion in the firm] in return for B’s sexual favours). (6) The cartelised auto industry case (contrived 
monopolies: major automobile manufacturers form a cartel to curtail drastically consumers’ rights of 
action  with  respect  to  personal  injuries).  (7)  The  single  mother  on  welfare  case  (non-monopolised 
necessity: a person in necessity contracts with another who lacks monopoly but the terms are especially 
burdensome to the first, reflected in high risks and low return). 
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doctrines frustration, contract modification and mutual mistake. These legal doctrines 
define  the  scope  of  permissible  private  or  judicial  adjustments  to  contractual 
relationships  in  the  light  of  new  information.  The  law  and  economics  literature 
generally argues that in long-term relationships there is a range of contractual and other 
strategies for adjusting the allocation of unknown and remote risks: explicit insurance, 
hedging  in  futures  markets,  indexing  clauses,  ‘gross  inequities’  clauses,  arbitration 
clause, etc. The absence of these from a long term contract thus reasonably implies that 
the promisor agreed to assume the risk in question. Still, there might be cases when this 
sort of informational deficiency justifies mandatory legal rules. 
 
4.5.2. Disclosure, cooling-off, unconscionability 
There  are  several  further  contractual  doctrines  that  are  intuitively  classified  as 
paternalistic. Still, in an economic sense they operate rather differently. Let’s indicate 
briefly  the  differences  between  three  of  them:  mandatory  disclosure,  cooling-off 
periods, and unconscionability. (What now follows is only a sketch of the argument.) 
Suppose two parties conclude a contract about the transfer of an asset with uncertain 
value (low or high, with some probabilities). Consumer sovereignty (“consumers should 
get  what  they  want”),  as  cited  above  from  Trebilcock  and  Friedman,  whether  it  is 
ultimately justified with welfare arguments or autonomy arguments or otherwise, sets a 
presumption against judicial intervention in this transaction. 
Disclosure rules are in this case about communicating information that there is a 
risk. The information may be written in fine print and thus there are arguments for 
requiring bigger letters. This can be justified in pure economic terms: it is less costly for 
the seller to produce the information. But the whole issue is clearly dealt with in the 
time before the realisation of the risk. 
The  rule  providing  a  mandatory  cooling-off  period  is  arguably  to  cure  the 
problems  of  weakness  of  will  and  other  defects  of  rationality,  e.g.  in  door  selling 
situations, by aggressive sales techniques etc. This rule is not obviously paternalistic. In 
theory,  the  sellers  are  interested  to  tie  themselves  and  offer  a  cooling-off  period 
voluntarily  to  the  buyers.  The  cooling-off  period  is  usually  short,  ending  (for  good 
economic reasons) before the realisation of the risk, often even before the delivery of 
the good. Still, in the EU the regulation is different; the good is already delivered during 
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the 14 days period of Rücktrittsrecht.  
The  third  doctrine,  unconscionability  works  differently  again.  Technically,  it 
works as an excuse when the seller wants to recollect money and the buyer, after finding 
out that he had bad luck (the low-value case realised), asks the court for assistance to 
rescind from the contract.
58 If unconscionability is applied to cases of the transfer of a 
good of uncertain value, this is in some sense opportunistic: only those with bad luck go 
to the court or have to go there because of non-payment. But, of course, the doctrine is 
not only or primarily applied to the case of risky exchanges. There may be a fully 
riskless, but simply involuntary exchange at issue, where judicial remedy should be 
available, even if in that case we face coercion or fraud and not (hard) paternalism in the 
meaningful sense of the word. Still, as the state of mind of the contracting parties is in 
most  cases  practically  improvable,  unconscionability  is  used  as  a  proxy  for 
involuntariness. Apart from this, there is still some space for paternalistic intervention, 
in the case of systematic cognitive failures. 
 
4.6. An outlook: paternalism in the new Hungarian Civil Code 
In  dealing  with  questions  about  the  optimal  amount  of  paternalistic  regulation  in 
contract law and then making proposals how to improve them necessitates more specific 
scrutiny of specific contract law rules. In the last sections of the thesis I will concentrate 
on  a  small  number  of  contractual  problems,  and  compare  how  they  are  solved  in 
different legal regimes. A special emphasis will be given to the contract rules of the new 
Civil Code of Hungary in order to contrast them with the previous rules and current 
European contract law regulations. 
  The draft of the new  Hungarian Civil Code is  a work of legal scholars slightly 
influenced by law and economics and strongly relying on European codifications and 
model rules. This impact however does not go much beyond such basic objectives as the 
reduction of transaction costs. The reasoning of the drafters is mainly systemic and 
comparative, rather than consequentialist. This historical background, of course only 
helps to explain the origins of the rules in the draft Code. In order to analyse, explain 
and criticise them, we shall use the tools developed in parts 2 and 3. 
                                                 
58  An  early  law  and  economics  analysis  of  unconscionability  is  Epstein  1975.  For  a  comparison  of 
mainstream and behavioural economic arguments on unconscionability, see Korobkin 2003a, b.  
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